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Abstract
This paper examines how revenues from a natural resource interact with
growth and welfare in an overlapping generations model with altruism. The
revenues are allocated between public productive services and direct transfers
to members of society by spending policies. We analyze how these policies
inuence the dynamics, and how the dynamics are inuenced by the abun-
dance of the revenue. Abundant revenues may harm growth, but growth and
welfare can be oppositely a¤ected. We also provide the socially optimal pol-
icy. Overall, the analysis suggests that variation in the strength of altruism
and in spending policies may be part of the reason why natural resources
seem to a¤ect economic performance across nations di¤erently.
Keywords: Natural Resources, Economic Growth, Welfare, Altruism
JEL Classication Codes: D64, O41, Q33, Q38
I wish to thank Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Massimo Franchi, Christian Groth, Christian Schultz,
Ragnar Torvik, seminar participants at the SURED 2006, at the EPRU seminar at the University
of Copenhagen, and at the 2005 annual DGPE workshop for their helpful discussions and sugges-
tions. Correspondence: Elisabeth Hermann Frederiksen, Department of Economics, University of
Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, 1455 Copenhagen - K, Denmark. E-mail: ehf@econ.ku.dk.
yThe activities of EPRU (Economic Policy Research Unit) are nanced through a grant from
The Danish National Research Foundation.
zFAME (Fisheries & Aquaculture, Management & Economics) is a network and resource school
within economics, and resource and sheries management at the University of Southern Denmark.
1 Introduction
The idea of a resource curse1 is not new; it dates back in history. The decline of
Spains prosperity after its colonization of the New World and discovery of large
amounts of gold and other precious metals is a classical example. Also within
recent decades, has the idea of a resource curse received support by a large body
of empirical (see Auty 1993, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001, among
others) as well as theoretical literature.2 Classical theories include the Dutch disease
theory (Corden and Neary 1982; Torvik 2001; van Wijnbergen 1984), rent seeking
problems (Tornell and Lane 1999; Torvik 2002), and political economy explanations
(Ross 2004, 2006; Robinson and Torvik 2005). Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) suggest
that natural resource rich countries are overshooting their consumption levels and
consequently converge to their steady states from above, which results in slow rates
of economic growth.
Empirical evidence, however, which questions an unconditional negative rela-
tionship between natural resources and growth, seems also to be emerging. Stijns
(2005) examines the e¤ect of natural resource abundance on growth rates in a
cross-country study by decomposing natural resources into four groups: oil and
gas, coal, minerals, and land. He concludes that only land is negatively correlated
with economic growth. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) investigate overall determinants
of growth rates by means of cross-country regressions. Among the robust and signif-
icant variables contributing positively to economic growth is the fraction of GDP in
1We use the term resource curseto describe the situation in which resource abundant nations
grow slower than nations endowed with fewer resources. In the literature, the term is sometimes
used in a more general way to describe poor economic performance. For our analysis, however, it
is important to distinguish between growth and welfare e¤ects.
2For a recent survey of the literature, consult Stevens (2003).
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mining. Besides, a classical counterexample to the resource curse is oil-rich Norway.
Larsen (2003) concludes that resources are a blessing for Norways economy.3
Yet only a limited number of theoretical studies have tried to explain a diverg-
ing experience in resource impact on economic performance. Exception includes
Mehlum et al. (2006). This paper argues that growth performance varies with how
resource revenues are distributed between grabbing and production, which, in
turn, depends on the type of institution. The paper empirically supports that the
resource curse is weaker, or completely missing, in countries with producer friendly
institutional quality. Another paper by Torvik (2001) proposes a Dutch disease
model which explains the variation in resource impact on economic outcomes by
di¤erences in learning by doing e¤ects across sectors. In general, however, while
there has been intense focus on analyzing natural resources in positive settings,
an important aspect, how best to manage the resource revenues despite potential
harmful growth e¤ects, has been largely ignored.4
Motivated by what could look like an empirical rejection of a pandemic resource
curse, this paper takes a closer look at how cross-country variation in the relation-
ship between growth performance and natural resources can be explained, and, in
addition, how this relationship relates to welfare.
Revenues from natural resources are typically managed by governments, and
political economic factors are likely to inuence how revenues are spent. Spending
policies, in turn, possibly matters for how revenues impact economic performance.
3He notes, however, a slow-down in growth after the mid-90s.
4One exception is Matsen and Torvik (2005). They analyze an optimal intertemporal consump-
tion path in a Dutch disease model, and show that the growth maximizing policy di¤ers from the
welfare maximizing policy. In their framework, this means some Dutch disease is optimal. Within
the literature of exhaustible natural resources, the literature of how optimally to manage resource
revenues in order to achieve intergenerational equity is well established, see, e.g., Hartwick (1977)
and Solow (1974, 1986).
2
The political economy literature often argues that abundant natural resources lead
to poor spending policies. The idea is that easy revenues corrupt, bring about
conicts (Ross 2004, 2006), and encourage economically ine¢ cient - but politically
important - projects (Robinson and Torvik 2005). To mitigate such problems,
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) suggest, at least for the case of Nigeria,
to decentralize revenues by distributing them directly to the people by which the
government is forced to nance public services by taxes. Taxes may be costly to
collect, yet overall society gains in that collecting taxes is claimed to incorporate a
disciplining mechanism which protects against wasteful projects.5
We argue that nations may be in di¤erent stages of economic development, or
what we refer to as di¤erent economic growth regimes, and that across such stages,
economic factors as private savings di¤er in the way they are generated. Insofar
that savings matter for growth, decentralized revenues may therefore have di¤erent
impacts on economic development.
We model the possibility of di¤erent growth regimes, and the possibility of
di¤erent spending policies in a unied framework. We use a two-period overlapping
generations growth model in which individuals are altruistic in that parents care
about the welfare of their children. Parents have the possibility to leave bequests,
which they will do, when their altruism is su¢ ciently high. In this case, the economy
is dynastic and behaves like a representative agent innitely-lived agent model,
whereas the economy behaves like an overlapping generations model, when altruism
is not intense enough and bequests are absent (Barro 1974; Weil 1987). Resource
5A similar proposal is made by Sandbu (2006). He argues that tax revenues di¤er from resource
revenues in that the rst is considered as out-of-pocket losses and the latter as forgone gains
by members of society. In general, he argues, members of society are more likely to hold the
government accountable for out-of-pocket losses than for forgone rents.
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revenues enter the model in every period as a xed fraction of man-made output.
They are allocated according to a spending policy as direct transfers to members
of society and as expenditures on a public productive service as in Barro (1990).
Our results suggest a potential caveat to decentralizing resource revenues. While
trying to avoid a resource curse created through political economy mechanisms by
distributing revenues directly to members of society, a resource curse may be cre-
ated due to economic factors instead. In addition, we examine various endogenous
spending policies and nd that under such policies, increased resource abundance
may lead to a shift in growth regime to a regime with a lower growth rate, as such
a shift implies higher welfare
Our model is related to that of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), but more gen-
eral. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) study a two-generation overlapping generations
model (without altruism), in which resource revenues are given entirely to the re-
tired old generation. Higher revenues means less savings, and therefore the economy
is resource cursed.6 Our study emphasizes that the resource curse is fragile with
respect to variation in the allocation of revenue across generations, and that poten-
tial adverse e¤ects on savings can be remedied by spending policies that stimulate
intergenerational transfers.
Our model is also related to the literature that studies e¤ectiveness of economic
policy in an altruistic setting. Caballe (1998) analyzes how taxation of labor and
capital inuences not only growth performance, but also the growth regime. In his
model, the level of altruism that distinguishes the growth regimes is determined by
6The authors consider in an appendix a situation, in which all individuals (i.e., young and old)
equally divide the resource revenue and nd that resource revenues are less harmful to savings
than when revenues are only given to the old.
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the tax policy. Croix and Michel (2002, ch. 5) analyze the neutrality of economic
policy, when the bequest motive is operative.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present the model in section 2. In section 3,
we explain the market equilibrium and characterize the conditions for the altruism
factor that distinguishes the growth regimes. In section 4, we examine di¤erent
policy objectives, derive corresponding spending policies, and analyze the impact
of natural resource revenues on growth and welfare under these policies. In section
5, we study the optimal policy, and the nal section provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy is closed and described by a one sided altruistic overlapping gener-
ationsframework. Parents care about the welfare of their o¤spring and have the
possibility to make intergenerational transfers to their immediate descendants in
the form of bequests. Individuals live for two periods: as young and as old. Only
the young generation works, the old generation is retired. There are L individuals
in each generation, which remains constant over time.
2.1 Natural Resource Revenues
In every period t; revenues from the sale of a natural resource enter the economy.
The value of the revenue is exogenously given as a xed fraction, ; of the real value
of man-made output, Yt; where 0 <  < 1: We may think of ; which we refer to as
resource abundance, as a characteristic that is country specic.7
7Natural resource revenues vary considerably across countries. For instance, Ice-
land, Nigeria, Norway and Venezuela have a share of primary exports in GDP above
0.2, whereas Nepal, Sweden and the US have a share of primary exports below 0.1.
(http://www.cid.havard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.)
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Let Et denote the real value of the revenue; then,
 =
Et
Yt
: (1)
Accordingly, our theoretical model applies also to inows of foreign aid and other
gifts and transfers from abroad.As the resource revenue man-made output ratio
is constant over time, we focus purely on spending policies in relation to intergen-
erational transfers and economic growth.8 Similar ways of modeling of the revenue
(or foreign aid) are found in Chatterjee et al. (2003), Lensink and White (2001),
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), and Torvik (2001).9
2.2 Spending Policies
Based on a spending policy, a government spends all resource revenues in every
period on one or two purposes.
First, it may allocate a share,  ; where 0   < 1; directly to members of society
in a lump-sum fashion.10 Of this share, the young share parameter, ; is given to
the young generation and (   ) to the old; i.e., 0     .
Second, the government invests the remaining resource revenue in a public ser-
vice ow, Gt; that works as input into production. We think of the public service as
a broad range of services that could be infrastructure, administration, legal, envi-
ronmental services, etc. There are no externalities associated with the use of public
services.
8For a reference on optimal resource extraction, consult Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
9Torvik (2001) discusses alternative ways of modeling the revenue in footnote 4, p. 290. The
important assumption is that the revenue grows over time so that, as a share of income, it does
not converge towards zero.
10A real example of direct transfers of resource rents is found in Alaska. One purpose of the so-
called Alaska Permanent Fund is to distribute the returns of the fund, which come from minerals
and oil, to all inhabitants of the state in the form of a check (Hannesson 2001).
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In every period, the government runs a balanced budget. It cannot issue debts
nor run surpluses by accumulating assets. Hence,
Gt = (1  )Et = (1  )Yt: (2)
Therefore, the resource constraint, which is the public budget, satises
Et + (   )Et + (1  )Et = Et = Yt: (3)
2.3 Firms
A representative rm produces man-made output, Yt; and uses three factors in
production: labor, L, the average public service ow per worker, gt  Gt=L, and
capital,Kt:Output per worker, yt; is produced according to the following production
technology:
yt = Ag

t k
1 
t ; (4)
where 0 <  < 1 is the share of labor and of public services in production, A is a
positive constant productivity term, and kt is capital per worker. Labor productiv-
ity increases as the public service ow per worker, gt; increases.11
The representative rm maximizes prots taking gt; as well as the price of out-
put, which is the numeraire, and of inputs, as given. Capital fully depreciates in
each period, and each factor is paid its private marginal product.
@Yt
@Kt
= (1  )A

gtL
Kt

= 1 + rt; (5)
@Yt
@Lt
= A

gtL
Kt

kt = wt: (6)
where rt is the rental rate of capital, and wt is the wage rate.
11The public service ow per worker is non-rival, but subject to congestion from L:
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2.4 Altruistic Individuals
Newborn individuals are identical within as well as across generations. A parent
is altruistic with respect to the welfare of her o¤spring in the Barro (1974) sense
and weights her o¤springs utility in her utility function, Vt: Let Ut denote utility
derived from life-cycle consumption; thus, total utility of an individual at time t
can be presented as
Vt = Ut + Vt+1; (7)
where 0 <  < 1 is the intergenerational discount factor, which we refer to as the
altruism factor. When generations are altruistic, parents care about the welfare of
their children, who in turn care about the welfare of their children, and so forth. In
this way, welfare of all future generations is linked.
Utility from own consumption is the sum of utility from consumption as young,
c1t; and the discounted utility of consumption as old, c2t+1. Specically,
Ut = u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) = ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1); (8)
where 0 <  < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor. By recursively eliminating
Vt+i; i = 0; :::;1; in (7) we have.12
Vt =
1P
i=0
i[ln(c1t+i) +  ln(c2t+1+i)]; (9)
saying that utility of a young individual born at time t equals own life-cycle utility
plus the discounted sum of life-cycle utilities of her descendants.
12Eq. (7) can be rewritten by induction as Vt =
PT
i=0 
i[u(c1t+i)+ u(c2t+1+i)] + 
T+1Vt+1+T :
Taking the limit for T ! 1 and assuming that total utility satisfy the limit condition
lim
T!1
T+1Vt+1+T = 0; we get Vt =
PT
i=0 
i(Ut+i): Using Ut = ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1); we have
(9).
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In any period t; the young individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor for
which she receives the market wage rate, wt. When the young share parameter,
; is positive, she also receives a direct transfer as a share of the natural resource
revenue, and, nally, she may inherit bequests, bt; from her parents. She consumes
c1t and saves st for her retirement; hence,
c1t + st = bt + wt + et; (10)
where et  Et=L denotes the lump-sum resource revenue income of a young at
time t: When old, she receives the proceeds of her saving, (1 + rt+1)st; where rt+1
is the rate of interest. In addition, if  < ; she receives income from the natural
resource, which she consumes and possibly bequeaths to her o¤spring. Accordingly,
her period two budget constraint can be written as
c2t+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + (   )et+1; (11)
where (   )et+1 is the resource revenue given lump-sum to an old person at time
t+ 1. Bequests cannot be negative, i.e., bt+1  0: This restriction prevents parents
from leaving debts to their children.
The dynamics of bequests are found by eliminating st in (10) and (11):
bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)(bt + wt + et   c1t) + (   )et+1   c2t+1: (12)
An individual of generation t maximizes life time utility given in (9) subject to
the two budget constraints, (10) and (11), and the non-negativity constraint on
bequests, by optimally choosing consumption, savings, and bequests, taking bt; wt;
rt+1; et; and et+1 as given.
The Lagrangian of period t is equal to life-cycle utility, Ut; with the change
pt+1bt+1 ptbt in the shadow value of bequests; pt; over a period (Croix and Michel
9
2002, 244)
Lt = ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1) + pt+1bt+1   ptbt: (13)
Note that bt+1  0 implies (1 + rt+1)(bt + wt + et) + (   )et+1  (1 + rt+1)c1t +
c2t+1: Incorporating this restriction in the maximization problem, the optimality
conditions, which are both necessary and su¢ cient, are given by
1
c1t
=
(1 + rt+1)
c2t+1
; (14)
and
bt+1


c1t+1
  
c2t+1

 0 (= 0 if bt+1 > 0): (15)
The transversality condition is
lim
t!1
tptbt = 0: (16)
Equation (14) describes the trade-o¤ between a persons consumption as young and
as old. In optimum, the individual is indi¤erent between consuming as young and
saving for old consumption. Equation (15) says that when bequests are positive,
a parents marginal utility of own consumption equals her marginal utility of the
o¤springs consumption. If a parents marginal utility from her o¤springs con-
sumption is less than the marginal utility of her own consumption, then bequests
are zero, and the solution is given by a corner solution.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
For simplicity, we normalize the number of working people, L; to unity, so we can
write Et = et; Yt = yt; Kt = kt; and Gt = gt: We obtain the following expression by
rewriting (4) using (2):
yt = Akt

(1  )yt
kt

, yt = [A(1  )] 11 kt  f( ; )kt (17)
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where @f(;)
@
< 0: The larger the share of the natural resource revenues spent on
direct transfers, the smaller the public service ow. This implies a smaller public
service ow capital ratio, gt
kt
. Due to the AK structure of the model, it also leads to
a drop in the output capital ratio. Therefore, all things equal, @f(;)
@
> 0; higher
revenues increase public services.
Using (4), factor market clearing implies
rt = (1  )A(gt
kt
)   1; (18)
wt = A(
gt
kt
)kt; (19)
and using (17) in (18) and (19), we get
rt = (1  )f( ; ; )  1  r( ; ); (20)
wt = f( ; ; )kt  w( ; )kt; (21)
where w( ; ) denotes the wage rate capital ratio. Both the rate of return and the
wage rate are positively associated with the public service ow capital ratio, gt
kt
;
and, thus, @r(;)
@
< 0 and @w(;)
@
< 0.
The capital market equilibrium requires savings of the young to equal capital
installed in the productive sector:
st = kt+1: (22)
Lastly, the goods market equilibrium is given by the aggregate resource constraint.
Using the budget constraints (10), and (11), and the equilibrium conditions (2),
(20), (21), and (22), the aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as
(1 + )yt = c1t + c2t + kt+1 + gt: (23)
11
Total income in period t is the sum of man-made output plus the natural resource
revenue.
3.1 Dynamics
In the following, we distinguish two growth regimes of the economy based on the
presence of intergenerational transfers. When parents marginal utility of own con-
sumption is larger than the marginal utility they derive from the o¤springs con-
sumption, the non-negativity constraint on bequests is binding, and there are no
bequests.
3.1.1 Zero Bequests
Assume that (15) holds with inequality so bequests are absent. Letting bt = bt+1 = 0
in (10) and (11), we can, by also using (14), derive the an expression for the savings
st :
st =

1 + 
[w( ; )kt + et]  (   )et+1
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )]
: (24)
Savings are increasing in wages and resource revenues received as young and decreas-
ing in resource revenues received as old. This is intuitive; consumption smoothing
requires higher savings the smaller income is as old compared to income as young.
Using (22), we get from (24)
kt+1 =

1 + 
[w( ; )kt + et]  (   )et+1
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )]
;
which is the law of motion of capital. Dividing both sides by kt; we nd
Ot+1 =

1 + 
[w( ; ) + 
et
kt
]  (   )
et
kt
(Ot+1 + 1)
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )]
  1;
where Ot+1=(kt+1=kt)  1 is the growth rate of capital (and also capital per worker
due to a constant labor force) when bequests are absent. Note that et = yt =
12
f( ; ; )kt: Rearrange, and Ot+1 can be expressed as
Ot+1 =
[1 + r( ; )][w( ; ) + f( ; )]
(1 + )[1 + r( ; )] + (   )f( ; )   1  
O(;  ; ): (25)
We dene a balanced growth path as a path along which c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt; and
et grow at constant relative rates in all periods t > 0. From (17) it follows that
capital grows at the same rate as output. Since resource revenues are given as a
xed fraction of output (in (1)), it follows immediately that also revenues grow at
the same rate as output. Moreover, as public services are given as a xed fraction
of total resource revenues (in (2)), public services grow at the same rate as output.
From the goods market equilibrium, (23), it follows that aggregate consumption (c1t
plus c2t) grows at the same rate of output. By (14), (20), and rt = r( ; ); it then
follows that period one and period two consumption grow at the rate of output.
Hence, the bequest constrained economy has no transitional economics; c1t; c2t; kt;
yt; gt; and et grow at the same rate along a balanced growth path at all periods t.
We denote values taken by the variables on the balanced growth path without
bequests with the superscript O:Using (20), (21), and taking kO0 > 0 as given,
equilibrium is given by
cO1t = f( ; )(+ )
1  + (   )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   ) k
O
t  cO1t(;  ; ); (26)
cO2t = f( ; )[1  + (   )]kOt  cO2t(;  ; ); (27)
kOt+1 =
(1  )f( ; )(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   ) k
O
t  kOt+1(;  ; ): (28)
On this growth path, parents behave as if they are selsh as they do not leave
intergenerational transfers. Essentially, the economy behaves like an overlapping
generations model.
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Growth is positive when income received in period one is su¢ ciently large to
ensure that savings exceed the capital depreciation. Accordingly, (1 )f( ; )(+
) > (1 + )(1  ) + (   ) implies that O(;  ; ) > 0:
3.1.2 Positive Bequests
When bequests are positive, (15) holds with equality, and the economy is dynastic.
In this regime, the growth rate of period one consumption, Dt+1; is found by dividing
the rst order solutions given in (14) and (15):
Dt+1 = [1 + r( ; )]  1  D(;  ; ): (29)
Again, we dene a balanced growth path as a path along which c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt;
bt; and et grow at a constant relative rates in all periods t > 0. From (17) it follows
that capital grows at the same rate as output. Since resource revenues are given
as a xed fraction of output (in (1)), it follows immediately that natural resource
revenues grows at the same rate as output. Moreover, as public services are given
as a xed fraction of resource revenues (in (2)), also public services grow at the
same rate as output.
By the goods market equilibrium, (23), and rt = r( ; ); it must be that if
capital and output grow as the same rate, then this rate equals that of growth
of consumption. From (14), we know that consumption as old and as young is a
constant ratio, so old consumption grows at the same rate as young consumption.
From either of the budget constraints (10) or (11), it follows that also bequests grow
at the same rate as consumption. Thus, also the bequest constrained economy has
no transitional economics; c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt; bt; and et grow at the same rate along
a balanced growth path at all periods t.
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From the rst order conditions to (13), it can be shown that pt equals 1c1t ;
when bequests are positive.13 Hence, pt decreases at the rate D( ; ):We can thus
conclude, when bt > 0; ptbt is a constant, and the transversality condition in (16)
simplies to  < 1. When (15) holds with equality, parents leave bequests and the
economy behaves like a dynasty of innitely-lived generations.
We denote values taken by the variables on the balanced growth path with
positive bequests with the superscript D:Equilibrium is given by
bDt = f( ; )

   + [+ (1 + )](1  )
 + 
  

kDt  bDt (;  ; );(30)
cD1t = f( ; )

1 +    (1  )
 + 

kDt  cD1t(;  ; ); (31)
cD2t = f( ; )

1 +    (1  )
 + 

kDt  cD2t(;  ; ); (32)
kDt+1 = f( ; )(1  )kDt  kDt+1(;  ; ); (33)
with kD0 > 0.
Along this growth path, the growth rate is positive when  > 1
1+r(;)
: This con-
dition says, for a young individual to have positive savings and bequests, marginal
utility of consuming one unit extra as young is less than marginal utility derived
from letting the o¤spring consume 1 + r( ; ) units.
Clearly, the growth paths described by (25) and (29) in general di¤er, as does
the way they respond to changes in revenues and in spending policies.
3.2 The Resource Curse
The resource curse typically indicates a negative relationship between natural re-
source abundance and economic performance. In this paper, the resource curse
13By (13), @Lt@c1t = 0 implies that
1
c1t
= pt+1[1 + r( ; )]; and @Lt@bt = 0 implies that pt =
pt+1[1 + r( ; )], so it follows that 1c1t = pt:
15
specically describes the situation where resource abundant nations grow slower
than nations endowed with fewer resources. We can think of two possibilities of
why an economy may be resource cursed: when spending policies are such that
increased abundance (i) leads to savings decline, and (ii) leads to a regime shift to
a regime with a lower growth rate. In the following, we explain and examine both
possibilities.
3.2.1 Savings Decline
Indeed, we nd that savings may be negatively inuenced by increased resource
revenues. In particular,
Lemma 1. There exists exogenous policies (  ; ) that imply a resource curse
only if at the same time bequests are absent (whether this is due to the policy or a
low altruism factor).
Proof. When bequests are absent, along O(; ):
@O(; )
@
=
n
@f(;)
@
(1  )(+ ) + f( ; )[(1  )   (1 )(+)( )
(1+)(1 )+( ) ]
o
(1 + )(1  ) + (   ) :
A policy where  = 0 and (1   2) > (1 )

(1 + ) implies @
O(;)
@
< 0: In a
dynastic growth regime,
@D(; )
@
= (1  )@f( ; )
@
> 0 8 0   < 1
proves the non-existence of a resource curse, when bequests are positive. 
An operative bequest motive eliminates the resource curse threat as the growth
rate in this regime is increasing in the rate of return to capital, which, in turn, is
increasing in resource abundance; i.e., @r(;)
@
> 0. Savings are una¤ected by the
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allocation of direct transfers as any change in revenues given to a young individual
is o¤set by an identical opposite change in bequests.14 Hence, the rate of growth in
this environment, D(;  ; ); is independent of :
When bequests are absent, accumulation of capital depends on the distribution
of resource revenues across generations. For example, a policy that distributes all
direct transfers solely to the old generation may lead to a resource curse outcome,
in which, higher resource abundance results in fewer savings. The resource curse
prevails when, due to increased resource abundance, a young individual derives
higher marginal utility of consuming as young than as old; i.e., what generates the
resource curse is a disproportional large direct transfer to the old generation in
the situation where bequests are absent. Therefore,
Proposition 1. Given an exogenous policy (  ; ), then when direct transfers
from the government are absent, or when they, if present, are allocated only to the
young generation, there is no resource curse.
Proof. By lemma 1, we only analyze an economy without bequests.
If  =  = 0; then
@O(; )
@
=

1 + 
@f( ; )
@
> 0 8  = 0;
and, if  =  ; then
@O(; )
@
=

1 + 

@f( ; )
@
(+ ) + f( ; )

> 0 8 0 <  < 1:

14To see this notice that along a balanced growth path, eq. (12) can be rewritten as
bDt () =
(1+r())(w()kDt +eDt  cD1t)+( )(1+D())eDt    (1+D())cD1t
(1+D()) (1+r()) ; where
@bDt ()
@ =  eDt : Now, write
st =

1+ (b
D
t + w()kDt + eDt )   ( )(1+
D())eDt  (1+D())bDt
(1+)(1+r())  sDt (): Calculating @s
D
t ()
@ using
@bDt ()
@ =  eDt gives @s
D
t ()
@ = 0:
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A larger inow of revenues, ceteris paribus, enhances the public service ow
capital ratio and, thus, the wage rate and the rate of return. When direct transfers
are positive, young income increases further relative to old income and savings grow.
We make an interesting observation about the resource curse:
Proposition 2. Increased resource abundance may improve welfare of the cur-
rent generations, despite causing a resource curse.
Proof. See appendix.
Next, we turn to examine how it can be determined that a particular economy
belongs to either of the two growth regimes and how the economy may shift between
growth regimes. In particular, we focus on relating these issues to spending policies
and to the size of the revenue to man-made output ratio, .
3.2.2 Growth Regime Shifts
Though the altruism factor, ; is exogenously given, whether bequests are positive
or zero, is determined endogenously by the rst order condition given in (15). From
(15), we know that when parents marginal utility of own consumption is greater
than their marginal utility from the o¤springs consumption, the economy is without
bequests. A decline in the consumption of the o¤spring relative to consumption of
the parent triggers intergenerational transfers, if the decline is large enough.
We dene the threshold value of the altruism factor, ; such that under a given
spending policy, ( ; ); when  =  then O(;  ; ) = D(;  ; ). In the special
case, where  = ; bDt (;  ; ) = 0 and parents leave zero bequests. Inverting (29),
substituting in (25), using (20), and (21) yields
 =
(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )  
(;  ; ): (34)
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Using this denition of ; we obtain the standard result (Caballe 1998; Cardia and
Michel 2004; Weil 1987) that, when the altruism factor is less than the threshold
value,  < (;  ; ); the economy is without bequest, and the growth path is
described by (25). On the other hand, when the altruism factor is higher than the
threshold value,  > (;  ; ), bequests are positive, and growth evolves according
to (29). We can now compare growth rates in the two regimes:
Proposition 3. Given  6= ; then, if the altruism factor ensures positive
bequests, the economy grows faster than if the altruism factor leads to absence of
bequests.
Proof. We note, by eq. (34), that eq. (25) can be rewritten as O(;  ; )
= (;  ; )(1  a)f( ; )  1: Since the economy follows this growth path as long
as  < (;  ; ); but changes to D(;  ; ) = (1   a)f( ; )   1 with positive
bequests when  > (;  ; ); it must be that O(;  ; ; ) < D(;  ; ): 
We observe in particular that (;  ; ) is a function of the spending policy
as well as the size of the natural resource abundance. The larger direct transfers
given to the young, ; the more altruistic the parents must be to leave bequests,
and the larger direct transfers given to the old, (   ); less altruistic parents
also leave bequests. In general, changes in  amplify di¤erences in direct transfers
across generations, and we give the following direct transfer allocation rules: When
 = [(1 + )(1 

) + 1]; there is no e¤ect on (;  ; ) from changes in ; i.e.,
@(; ;)
@
= 0; and when  < (>)[(1 + )(1 

) + 1]; @
(; ;)
@
> (<)0: Therefore,
changes in  may push economies from one growth regime to another. In the
following, we examine what happens to the growth rate when increases in  cause
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the economy to shift regime:
Proposition 4. Given the exogenous spending policy ( ; ), when an economy
shifts from one growth regime to another growth regime due to increased natural
resource abundance, the growth rate goes up.
Proof. See appendix.
Summing up, this section illustrates spending policies matter and that they mat-
ter di¤erently depending on the presence of bequests. When spending policies are
exogenous, the resource curse prevails as a consequence of savings decline, whereas
regime shifts caused by endogenous changes in the threshold altruism factor due to
higher resource abundance lead to higher growth rates. Finally, we note that the
resource curse and welfare gains may be opposite sides of the same coin.
4 Political Equilibrium
It seems reasonable, however, to think of spending policies as typically endogenously
determined by a specic economic or political agenda. Therefore, in this section we
ask a slightly di¤erent question, namely if there are economies in which the resource
curse exist under endogenous policies. We examine specic policy objectives.
4.1 Growth Maximizing Policies
Lemma 2. Let bO and bO be the growth maximizing policy when the public budget is
given by the resource revenues (in (3)) and the economy is constrained to be without
bequests. Then bO =  and
bO = ( 0 if 1    2  0
1    2

if 1    2

> 0
:
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When direct transfers are positive and
given to the young, they inuence the growth rate through two channels between
which there is a trade-o¤. The higher  ; the larger direct transfers (to the young
generation) which, ceteris paribus, leads to larger savings for retirement. The higher
 ; however, the less public service input into private production. Lower public
service input into production leads to lower marginal factor productivity, and lower
wage rates means fewer savings for retirement.15
When  = bO =  and  = bO  bO(; ); savings are maximized under the
given public budget and generate the highest feasible growth rate in a no bequest
environment. We notice, when the value of bO(; ) is given by a corner solution,
the rate of economic growth will increase further if the government is able to collect
lump-sum taxes to expand the public service. In such a situation the size of the
public service ow is sub-optimal.
Notice also @bO(;)
@
> 0 when 1   2

> 0: This means that the more abundant
the resource, a larger share of the revenues is given as direct transfers in order to
maximize growth. The reason is that the larger ; the higher the value of one unit
of direct transfer. Higher costs, in terms of lower factor payments, can therefore be
tolerated; i.e., the benets exceed the costs up until the new policy rule.
Lemma 3. Let bD be the growth maximizing policy when the public budget is
given by the resource revenues (in (3)) and the economy is constrained to be with
15Moreover, less public service input into production means less man-made output. Since re-
source revenues are a xed fraction of total output, this e¤ect feeds back into lowering the total
amount of resource revenues to be distributed in the rst place. This externality, however, is not
internalized in the competitive equilibrium.
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positive bequests. Then bD = 0:
Proof. Because @
D(: ;)
@
=  @r(;)
@
< 0 we have that bD = 0: 
In the innitely-lived generationsenvironment, the growth maximizing policy
is independent of the magnitude of the natural resource abundance; letting resource
revenues work as input into production leads to higher growth rates, since the rate
of return is highest, when direct transfers  are zero.
Combining lemma 2 and 3, it can be shown that when   2
1  , the growth max-
imizing policy is identical for the two growth regimes, namely zero direct transfers.
Proposition 5. Under growth maximizing policies, a resource curse does not
exist; increased natural resource abundance enhances growth.
Proof. See Appendix.
The growth maximizing spending policy depends on the strength of altruism.
For high values of the altruism factor, in order to enhance growth, all resource
revenues are invested in public services, and for low values of altruism, the growth
maximizing policy is to allocate a share of the natural resource revenues as direct
transfers to the young.
Growth maximizing policies may, however, su¤er from another potential prob-
lem: dynamic ine¢ ciency. When bequests are absent, the only way for the young to
provide for themselves when old, is to save, which they may do even if the interest
rate is very low. In this case, transferring resources from the young generation to
the old generation is Pareto e¢ cient.
Dynamic ine¢ ciency in endogenous growth models occurs when the competitive
real rate of interest falls short of the growth rate (King and Ferguson 1993). This
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condition corresponds to () > 1:16 Under growth maximizing policies, if, e.g.,
bO = bO = 1      2

; then (bO;bO; ) = (+)
1+
; therefore, in this case, growth
maximizing policies trigger dynamic ine¢ ciency when  > 1
+ 1 and bequests are
absent.
4.2 Young and Old Policies
In this section, either the young or the old decide a policy, which is implemented
by the government. The policy remains unaltered in perpetuity,17 and the policy
decision is made at the beginning of some arbitrary initial period. After determining
the policy, the young earn a wage, decide their savings knowing whether they receive
a direct transfer from the government or bequests or both. The old receive a return
on their savings, possibly receive a direct transfer from the government, and possibly
leave bequests.
At time t; the utility of a young person is given as in (9):
V t =
1P
i=0
i[ln(c1t+i) +  ln(c2t+1+i)]; (35)
=
1
1  

ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t) +

 + 
1  

ln[1 + ]

: (36)
The young derive utility of own consumption both as young and as old as well of
consumption of their heirs. The old, on the other hand, only derive utility of own
consumption as old and of consumption of their heirs:
V t = ln(c2t) +
1P
i=0
1+i[ln(c1t+i) +  ln(c2t+1+i)]; (37)
= ln(c2t) +

1  

ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t) +

 + 
1  

ln[1 + ]

: (38)
Nevertheless,
16O(;  ; ) > r( ; ), (; )(1  a)f( ; )  1 > (1  a)f( ; )  1() (; ) > 1:
17A similar assumption is made in Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
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Proposition 6. The resource curse can exist when individuals have a very
smallaltruism factor and spending policies are decided by an old generation.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the economy is borderline non-altruistic,a policy decided by the old can
trigger a resource curse. This may not be surprising in that the old generation care
overridingly about its own consumption. Yet since the old receive a higher return
to savings the higher the rate of return, the old do not claim all resource revenues.
A part, if not all, of the revenue is still allocated to public services. Therefore, a
non-altruisticeconomy ruled by the old is not automatically cursed.
Unfortunately, nding closed form solutions to the welfare maximizing policy of
either generation cannot seem to be done in this model. By imposing an additional
assumption to the problem, however, we are able to obtain such results.
Assumption 1.  =  : (Only the young receive direct transfers from the gov-
ernment.)
As the assumption exogenously determines the intergenerational allocation of
potential direct transfers from the government, we refer to policies under assumption
1 as quasi-endogenousspending policies. In the following, young policies and old
policies, i.e., the policies that the young or the old implement in order to maximize
their welfare, are accordingly quasi-endogenousspending policies.
Assumption 1 is not binding when bequests are positive, since any change in
the distribution of direct transfers of natural resource revenues across generations
is o¤set by an opposite change in bequests. Assumption 1 does, however, a¤ect the
threshold altruism factor positively, which pushes economies towards being in the
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overlapping generationsregime.
Under assumption 1, let  and  denote the policy that maximizes V t and V t
given the size of the public budget given by the resource revenues. When  and  are
zero, utility will increase further if the government collects lump-sum payments to
increase the size of the public service. In this case, expanded public services increase
the wage rate and the return to capital, which leads to an overall increase in utility.
We analyze this possibility in the next section, but for now, the maximum size of
the public service is bounded from above by inows of natural resource revenues,
as under growth maximizing policies.
Let O be the spending policy that maximizes young welfare subject to the
public budget restriction when the economy is constrained to be without bequests,
and let D be the spending policy that maximizes young welfare, also subject to
the public budget restriction, when the economy is constrained to be with positive
bequests. Moreover, dene O  1+
(1 )+1+
1 

and D  (1  )O: Then, under
assumption 1,
Lemma 4. Young policy when the economy is constrained to be in either growth
regime:
O =
(
0 if O  
O 
(1+O)
if O > 
and D =
(
0 if D  1  (1  )
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
if D > 1  (1  ) :
Proof. See Appendix.
Likewise, subject to the public budget restriction, let O be the spending policy
that maximizes welfare of the old generation when the economy is constrained to
be without bequests, and let D be the spending policy that maximizes old welfare
when the economy is constrained to be with positive bequests. Moreover, dene
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O  1+
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

and D  (1 )(
1+

)
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

: Then, under assumption
1,
Lemma 5. Old policy when the economy is constrained to be in either growth
regime:
O =
(
0 if O  
O 
(1+O)
if O > 
and  I =
(
0 if D  1  (1  )
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
if D > 1  (1  ) :
Proof. See Appendix.
We notice that the young and old spending policies,  and  ; are both func-
tions of the intertemporal and intergenerational discount factors as well as resource
abundance;   (; ) and   (; ):
In both growth regimes, the marginal loss of increasing direct transfers is a
decline in public service input into production, which channels into lower factor
payments. The trade-o¤ faced by the individual depends on the weights given in
her welfare function, which, in turn, depends on whether she is young or old, and
the growth dynamics. For example, when bequests are absent, all things equal, the
young are more likely to implement a spending policy that involves direct transfers;
O > O; @
O()
@O
> 0 and @
O()
@O
> 0: The young generations value the utility of own
consumption in their utility function undiscounted, whereas the old discount the
o¤springs utility of young consumption using the intergenerational discount factor.
The marginal utility the young obtain from direct transfers is therefore higher and
o¤sets higher marginal utility costs which the direct transfers impose.
Moreover, under assumption 1,
Proposition 7. Within either growth regime, a resource curse does not exist
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under either young or old policies; increased natural resource abundance enhances
growth.
Proof. See Appendix.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that under assumption 1, increased
natural resource abundance increases welfare of the young and the old under both
a young and an old policy, when the growth regime remains unaltered. Under both
policies, @c
O
1t(;)
@
> 0;
@cD1t(;)
@
> 0;
@cO2t(;)
@
> 0;
@cD2t(;)
@
> 0; and by proposition 7,
@O(;)
@
> 0 and @
D(;)
@
> 0, so by (36) and (38) we have that within either regime
@V t
@
> 0 and @V t
@
> 0 8  =  and 0   < 1.
Lemma 4 and 5 imply that young and old policies are likely to vary, which means
that also growth rates may vary across political regimes. An economy under either
a young or an policy may grow faster in either regime. We notice also that young
and old policies di¤er from growth maximizing policies (derived in lemma 2 and
3), when direct transfers are present. On the other hand, policies decided by the
young, the old, as well as growth maximizing policies are coincident, when direct
transfers are zero.
4.2.1 Growth Regime Shifts and the Resource Curse
The quasi-endogenous spending policies of an economy ruled by the young or
the old laid out in lemma 4 and 5 are policies which are constrained by presence
or absence of bequests. This section illustrates that the young or the old may be
able to, through their policies, determine whether bequests are present or not, and
unlike growth maximizing policies, young or old policies can imply a resource curse.
It su¢ ces to analyze either of the above quasi-endogenouspolicies, since the
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mechanism is the same. We choose to analyze an economy ruled by the young and
apply a numerical example given by  = 0:3; 18  = 0:33 and  = 0:55; 19 so that
O = 1:60 and D = 1:12 by lemma 4.
For the parameter values chosen for this example, a young policy, which is
constrained by positive bequests, involves positive transfers when resource abun-
dance is high (when the condition in lemma 4, D > 1   (1   ); is fullled)
and, accordingly, (D(; ); ) grows as parents must be increasingly altruistic to
leave positive bequests. The possibility of positive bequests remains, however, since
(D(; ); ) <  for all values of 0 <  < 1 in the example. Yet at a certain
level of resource abundance, the economy could also be in the overlapping genera-
tionsgrowth regime. At these levels of resource abundance, direct transfers under
a no bequest constrained young policy would involve transfers so high that par-
ents would not leave bequests. Interestingly, therefore, the economy, for values of 
high enough, could be on a growth path with zero or with positive bequests. The
young, therefore, must compare welfare levels to determine the regime in which to
set young policy which is not constrained by presence or absence of bequests.
Fig. 1 maps utility levels of a representative young individual under either
growth regime along with the corresponding growth rates at di¤erent values of .
Both utility levels and growth rates of either regime increase the higher :We only
map utility and growth rate in the overlapping generationsregime for relevant
values of , i.e., when the economy could be in this regime under young policy.
Utility levels are illustrated by the thick lines and thus the line, which crosses
from below, illustrates utility levels for the overlapping generations regime, whereas
18This value is taken from Croix and Michel (2002, 255).
19Assuming each period is 30 years, this corresponds to an annual discount rate of 2 percent.
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the other - kinked - line illustrates utility levels for the dynastic regime. The kink
occurs then direct transfers become positive. At this point, a smaller share of the
resource revenue is allocated to productive public services and the direct transfers
from the government to the young are o¤set by a decline in parents bequests.
Therefore, the growth rate increases at a slower rate when  gets higher. The fact
that both consumption as young and old, as well as the growth rate, enters the
welfare function of the young given in (36), explains the kink.
10.8750.750.6250.5
Xi
Growth rates; Ut ility
Figure 1. Growth rates and utility levels for a young person under di¤erent
policies considered by a young policy maker at di¤erent levels of natural resource
abundance.
Growth rates are illustrated by the thin lines in g. 1. The line, which starts
at  = 0:5; illustrates the growth rate for the dynastic regime, and the line, which
crosses it from below, illustrates the growth rate under the no bequest regime.
Generally, the growth rates vary across growth regimes, and, we notice, that the
dynastic growth rate has the kink that corresponds to the level of revenues at which
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positive direct transfers set in. Comparing utility levels, as  becomes higher, there
is a utility gain for the young person from shifting from the dynastic regime to over-
lapping generations regime. By shifting growth regime, as natural resources become
more abundant, the young receives a larger direct transfer from the government,
which, despite at the expense of bequests, leads to higher consumption levels as
young, and, despite the drop in the growth rate, in higher welfare levels.
Indeed, the depicted economy experiences a decline in the growth rate, when,
in response to higher resource revenues, the young policy maker decides a policy
which shifts the economy from the dynastic regime to the overlapping generations
regime with a lower growth rate.
5 The Optimal Policy
This section introduces a social planner, whos objective is to maximize welfare,
Wt; of current and all future generations. The role for a social planner is threefold
as the model has three sources of inequality between the social planner equilibrium
and the market equilibrium. First, the positive e¤ect on GDP from man-made
production, in the form of increased resource revenue, is external to the producers
leading to under-saving and under-accumulation of capital. Second, in the market
equilibrium, investments in the public service are restricted by the available budget,
namely the resource revenues, and there may be economies for which an optimal
size of public service ow is not feasible. Lastly, we noted that when bequests are
absent, the competitive equilibrium may be dynamically ine¢ cient.
Welfare at time t = 0, W0; is given as a weighted sum of current and future
utilities of the members of society by a social welfare function that can be presented
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as
W0 =  ln(c20) +
1P
t=0
t+1[ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1)]; (39)
where  is the is the planners intergenerational discount factor.20
The social planner runs a balanced budget, and the resource constraint is the
same as in the market economy, given by
(1 + )yt = c1t + c2t + kt+1 + gt; (40)
with initial capital k0 > 0: The variable gt denotes the level of public service chosen
by the social planner. Using this constraint, and substituting c1t; (39) can be
rewritten as
W0 =  ln(c20) +
1P
t=0
t+1 ln f[(1 + )yt   c2t   kt+1   gt] +  ln(c2t+1)g : (41)
The necessary transversality condition is given by
lim
t!1
tqtkt = 0; (42)
where qt is the shadow price of the capital stock. Equation (42) ensures that the
discounted value of wealth tends to zero and that (39) converges (Croix and Michel
2002, 252).
The solution to the social planners problem is found by di¤erentiating (41) with
respect to c2t; kt+1; and gt. We obtain the following conditions satised for all
periods, t :

c1t
=

c2t
; (43)
and
1
c1t
=
[(1 + )@yt
@kt
]
c1t+1
: (44)
20For simplicity, the private intergenerational discount factor equals that of the social planner.
In principle, they could di¤er.
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Equation (43) says that the ratio between the utility of consumption of the young
and the old generation must equal the ratio between the intertemporal and intergen-
erational discount factor. Unlike the solution to the altruistic generationsproblem,
this equation must hold, since otherwise welfare would increase by shifting con-
sumption across generations. Equation (44) says that the ratio between utility of
young consumption in two consecutive periods must equal the intergenerational
discount rate multiplied with the gross return on capital, since this is the return to
savings. As capital fully depreciates, the social return to capital, rspt ; is
(1 + )
@yt
@kt
= (1 + )(1  )yt
kt
= 1 + rspt ; (45)
so (44) can be rewritten as
1
c1t
=
(1 + rspt )
c1t+1
: (46)
The social planner chooses an optimal public service ow that satises
(1 + )
@yt
@gt
= 1: (47)
In optimum, the marginal benet of increasing the public service, the rise in man-
made output plus resource revenues, is exactly equal to the cost of doing so. By
use of (4), (47) can be expressed as
gt = (1 + )yt: (48)
As gt is a constant fraction of yt; in optimum, the public spending output ratio is
constant. Applying this expression of gt; we can rewrite (4) as
yt = Akt

(1 + )yt
kt

, yt = [A(1 + )] 11 kt  f sp()kt: (49)
Using (49), we can express rspt from (45)
rspt = (1 + )(1  )f sp()  1  rsp(): (50)
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By (46), the growth rate in the consumption of the young generation, t+1; is
t+1 = [1 + r
sp()]  1  (): (51)
We dene an optimal balanced growth path as a path along which c1t; c2t; kt; yt;
gt; and et grow at a constant relative rates, (); at all periods t > 0. From (49) it
follows that capital grows at the same rate as output. Since resource revenues are
given as a xed fraction of output (in (1)), it follows immediately that the inow
of natural resource revenues grows at the same rate as output. Moreover, as public
services are given as a xed fraction of total resource revenues (in (57)), also public
services grow at the rate of output.
By the resource constraint (in (40)) and (50) it must be that if capital and
output grow at the same rate, then this rate equals that of consumption. From
(43), we know that the ratio of young and old consumption is constant; thus, old
consumption grows at the same rate as young consumption.
It can be shown that qt equals 1c1t 1 (Croix and Michel 2002, 103) and therefore
decreases at the rate (), and the transversality condition in (16) simplies to
 < 1. To ensure non-negative growth, we assume that   1
1+rsp()
: The economy
has no transitional economics; c1t; c2t; kt; yt; gt; and et are an optimal solution to
the social planners problem and grow at the same rate along a balanced growth
path at all periods, where (51) characterizes the balanced growth path. Along such
a path, equilibrium is given by
c1t =
(1  )
 + 
(1 + )(1  )f sp()kt  c1t(); (52)
c2t =
(1  )
 + 
(1 + )(1  )f sp()kt  c2t(); (53)
kt+1 = (1 + )(1  )f sp()kt  kt+1(); (54)
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with k0 > 0 given.
5.1 Decentralization
We proceed to show how the social planner may decentralize the optimal solution
just derived. Decentralization requires three policy instruments since one external-
ity has to be internalized, public services have to be nanced, and the competitive
equilibrium may be dynamically ine¢ cient.
To internalize the spillover e¤ect from man-made production onto resource rev-
enues, the social planner subsidizes the rms with the resource inow. The repre-
sentative rm solves
max
Kt;L

(1 + )AK1 t (gtL)
   rtKt   wtL
	
; (55)
taking gt; rt; and wt as given. Hence, from the standpoint of the rm,
rt = (1 + )(1  )f sp()  1 = rsp(); (56)
and the private marginal return to capital coincides with the social marginal return.
As resource revenues are allocated to the rms, the social planner collects lump-
sum taxes to invest in the public service. It is convenient to let the tax be a share
of GDP, so
e(1 + )yt = gt; (57)
where the lump-sum tax rate, e ; is a constant. It follows from the balanced budget
that 0 < e < 1. The social planner collects a share, e; of the tax payments from
the young generation and the rest, (1   e); from the old generation. An altruistic
individual is now faced with the following budget constraint:
c1t + st = bt + wt   egt; (58)
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when young, and
c2t+1 + bt+1 = [1 + r
sp(; )]st   (1  e)gt+1; (59)
when old, where the real wage rate, wt; can be derived from (55), and bt  0:
Lemma 6. Let e and e be a policy that decentralizes the resource allocation
chosen by the social planner. Then e =  and e = 1  1 

(1+)
+
.
Proof. The size of the public service is optimal when (48) equals (57). Hence,
e = :
The transfer which ensures the competitive consumption path equals the optimal
consumption path when bequests are absent satises for old consumption, by (59)
and (53), that
[1 + rsp()]kt   (1  e)gt = (1  )
 + 
(1 + )(1  )f sp()kt:
Substituting rsp(); kt; and gt; and solving for e; we nd e = 1  1  (1+)+ :
When bequests are positive, they are given by
bt = (1 + )f
sp()[(1  )(1 + )
 + 
  (1  e)]kt
which is positive for e > 1  1 

(1+)
+
and just zero when e = 1  1 

(1+)
+
: As
@bt
@e = (1 + )f sp()kt = gt;
and as
c2t = [1 + r
sp()]kt   (1  e)gt   bt
so
@c2t
@e = 0;
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consumption is invariant to changes in e as long as e  1  1 

(1+)
+
. 
The share, e; thus provides a lower bound on how little the young may be
taxed and still leave the parent at least indi¤erent between leaving bequests or not.
When 1 > e > 0; both the old and the young contribute to the public service.
When e = 0 only the old pay, and when e < 0; only the old pay and the young
generation receives a transfer. The share, e; cannot be higher than one, since then
the young would have negative consumption.
As we expect, an optimal balanced growth path is dynamically e¢ cient. When
e = 1  1 

(1+)
+
; parents are indi¤erent about leaving bequests and  = : Since
 < 1; the rate of return is higher than the rate of growth. Finally,
Proposition 8. Under optimal policies, welfare and growth increase when in-
ows of natural resource revenues increase.
Proof. By (39),
Wt =  ln c2t +
1
1  

ln(c1t) +  ln(c2t+1) +
(1 + )
1   ln(1 + ())

:
As @()
@
> 0 we can conclude that the resource curse does not exist, and, further
by @c1t()
@
> 0 and @c2t()
@
> 0; that @Wt
@
> 0: 
6 Concluding Remarks
Using an endogenous growth model with altruistic overlapping generations, we ex-
plain why nations may respond di¤erently to natural resource abundance: Nations
may be in di¤erent growth regimes that vary in how savings are a¤ected by natural
resource revenues.
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As rst pointed out by Weil (1987), there is a threshold level of altruism which
separates the two growth regimes. In our model, this threshold level of altruism,
which is determined endogenously, is inuenced by the allocation and the abundance
of the resources. When parentsaltruism is higher than the threshold altruism level,
the bequest motive is operative, and resource abundance increases growth as well
as welfare of either generation. Bequests interrupt the connection between direct
transfers from the government and savings by allowing for o¤setting intergenera-
tional transfers from the old to the young. Therefore, savings are una¤ected by how
resource revenues are allocated across generations. In contrast, a resource curse may
exist when the bequests motive is not strong enough that parents leave bequests.
In this case, policies that allocate revenues to the old generation may harm savings
of the young and, subsequently, growth. Yet the e¤ect on the current generations
welfare is ambiguous; resource abundance may increase consumption levels which
then (perhaps more than) compensates for reduced growth.
We also examine spending policies that are endogenously determined by a spe-
cic economic or political agenda. We nd that a resource curse is avoided by
growth maximizing policies. Under such policies, when bequests are absent, any
direct transfers are given exclusively to the young generation. Higher resource abun-
dance merely increases direct transfers, and, hence, savings and growth. When be-
quests are positive, all revenues are allocated to public services, since, in a dynastic
regime, growth expands with more public services. Public services, in turn, expand
with the revenue under this spending policy.
Instead, a resource curse may be triggered by gerontocracy when altruism is
very small.The old generation may prefer to allocate to itself direct transfers to
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an extent that higher resource abundance reduces savings of the young generation.
We also examine spending policies decided by a young and an old generation
respectively. Unfortunately, however, we can only nd closed form solutions to the
welfare maximizing spending policy of either generation when the old generation
is excluded from receiving direct transfers. In this case, however, a decline in
growth rates caused by increased resource abundance implies an increase in welfare.
Thus, the general use of the term poor economic performance in relation to
slower economic growth rates may be misleading. Nevertheless, by solving the
social planners problem, we show that under optimal polices there can never be a
resource curse as dened here.
Further theoretical work may seek to endogenize the policy decision which is
modeled exogenously in this model. Such models will add to the literature on polit-
ical economy explanations for the resource curse. Another extension is to examine
other allocations of the resource revenue. In particular, a model in which the re-
source revenue is used only as direct transfers as suggested by Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) may lead to more explicit solutions. In addition, research into
what factors, for instance, life-expectancy or fertility, that inuence the strength
of the bequest motive may be helpful in identifying how nations are a¢ liated with
growth regimes, or development stages.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove proposition 2 by presenting parameter combinations for which @
O()
@
< 0
and, for both the young and the old generation, @Vt
@
> 0.
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Utility of a representative young individual at time t in the overlapping gener-
ationsregime, V
O
t ; is given as
V
O
t =
1
1  

ln(cO1t) +  ln(c
O
2t) +

 + 
1  

ln(1 + O(; ))

;
(this equation is the same as (36) in the main text), where
@V
O
t
@
=
1
1  
8<:
@cO1t
@
cO1t
+

@cO2t
@
cO2t
+

 + 
1  
 @O(;)
@
1 + O(; )
9=; : (60)
Utility of a representative old individual at time t in the overlapping generations
regime, V Ot ; is given as
V Ot = ln(c
O
2t) +

1  

ln(cO1t) +  ln(c
O
2t) +

 + 
1  

ln(1 + O(; ))

;
(this equation is the same as (38) in the main text), where
@V Ot
@
=
@cO1t
@
cO1t
+

1  
8<:
@cO1t
@
cO1t
+

@cO2t
@
cO2t
+

 + 
1  
 @O(;)
@
1 + O(; )
9=; : (61)
When  = 0; then
@cO1t
@
cO1t
=

(1  ) +

1  +   

(1 + )(1  ) +  ; (62)
and
@cO2t
@
c02t
=

(1  ) +

1  +  ; (63)
and
@O(;)
@
1 + O(; ) =

(1  )  

(1 + )(1  ) +  : (64)
Substituting (62), (63), and (64) in (60) and (61) gives
@V
O
t
@
=
1
1  
8<:
h
1 + + +
1 
i
(1  ) +
(1 + )
1  +   

h
1+
1 
i
(1 + )(1  ) + 
9=; ;
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and
@V Ot
@
=

(1  ) +

1  +  + 
@V
O
t
@
:
We proceed by use of a numerical example in which  = 0:2;  = 0:5; and  = 0:1:
By the proof of lemma 1, @
O()
@
< 0 , (1   2) > (1 )

(1 + ): Hence,
(1  2) > (1 )

(1 + ) implies for the numerical example that
 > 0:4:
Moreover, @V
O
t
@
> 0 implies
6:5
3
+
6
0:8 + 
 

1
0:9

6
1:2 + 
> 0;
and @V
O
t
@
> 0 implies
1
4
+

0:8 + 
+ 0:1

6:5
3
+
6
0:8 + 
 

1
0:9

6
1:2 + 

> 0:
Since 1
4
+ 
0:8+
> 0 then @V
O
t
@
> 0 implies @V
O
t
@
> 0: Hence, we can focus on welfare
of the young generation. We complete the proof by providing an example where
 > 0:4 and 6:5
3
+ 6
0:8+
   1
0:9

6
1:2+
> 0. For example,  = 0:5 > 0:4 satises
the rst condition, and  = 0:5 ) 6:5
3
+ 3
1:2
    1
0:9

3
1:7
= 2:7058 > 0 satises the
second condition. Hence,  = 0:5 satises @
O()
@
< 0; @V
O
t
@
> 0 and @V
O
t
@
> 0: 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Combining (34) and (25) gives O(; ) = (; )(1  a)f( ; )  1: Then,
@O(; )
@
=
@(; )
@
[(1  a)f( ; ; )] + (; )(1  a)@f( ; )
@
:
By (29), we derive
@D(; )
@
= (1  a)@f( ; )
@
:
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There are three situations: @
(;)
@
= 0; @
(;)
@
> 0; and @
(;)
@
< 0:
First, when@
(;)
@
= 0; the growth regime remains unaltered by higher resource
revenues and @
O(;)
@
> 0 and @
D(;)
@
> 0 since @f(;)
@
> 0:
Second, when @
(;)
@
> 0; if an economy changes regime, it changes from a
dynastic to an overlapping generations regime. When  = (; ); by denition,
O(; ) = D(; ): At this point, @O(;)
@
> @
D(;)
@
; and O(; ) crosses D(; )
from below. Hence, when the economy shifts from D(; ) to O(; ); the economy
grows faster on the new growth path than on the old growth path.
Third, when @
(;)
@
< 0; if the economy changes regime, it changes from an
overlapping generations regime to a dynastic regime. Again, when  = (; ); by
denition, O(; ) = D(; ): In this point, @O(;)
@
< @
D(;)
@
, and O(; ) crosses
D(; ) from above. Hence, when the economy shifts from O(; ) to D(; ); the
economy grows faster on the new growth path than on the old growth path. 
7.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We consider the problem
max
;
O(;  ; ) subject to   0;    ; and  < 1:
The growth rate, O(;  ; ); is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions
are all linear. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient.
The Lagrangian is
L = (1  )f()(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )   1 + 1   2(   )  3(   1):
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The ve Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
(1  )f()
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

1 +
+ 
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

+ 1   2 = 0 (65)
(1  )(+ )
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

@f()
@
  f()
(1 + )(1  ) + (   )

+ 2   3 = 0 (66)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (67)
2  0;    ; 2(   ) = 0 (68)
3  0;  < 1; 3(   1) = 0 (69)
If  = 0 and  = 0 then 3 = 0: Combination of (65) and (66) yields
1 =
 
h
f() + @f()
@

i
1 + 
:
Since 1  0; 2  1   must be satised for this to be a solution. In this case,
2 =
f()
1 + 
+
f()
(1 + )2(1  ) + 1 > 0;
which is then a solution.
If  = 0 and  > 0; then 2 = 3 = 0: Hence, from (65)
1 =   (1  )f()
(1 + )(1  ) + 

1 +

(1 + )(1  ) + 

;
which contradicts 1  0:
If  > 0 and  > 0; then 1 = 3 = 0: Hence, from (65) for this to be a solution,
2 > 0; and by (68), this requires  =  : Using (65) in (66), we have
@f()
@
(+ ) + f() = 0;
which is satised when  = 1    2

:
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(;  ; 1; 2; 3) = (1   2 ; 1   
2

; 0; f()
1+
+ f()(+)
(1+)2(1 ) ; 0) if
2

< 1 ; and
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(;  ; 1; 2; 3) = (0; 0;
 [f()+ @f()@ ]
1+
; f()
1+
+ f(;)
(1+)2(1 )  
[f()+ @f()@ ]
1+
; 0) if
2

 1  . 
7.4 Proof of Proposition 5
First, consider the economy without bequests. Let bO denote the growth rate under
a growth maximizing spending policy when the economy is without bequests, then
bO = b(1  ) bfO   1  bO(bO;bO; ); (70)
where b  (bO;bO; ) = (+bO)
(1+)(1 ) and
bfO  f(bO; ). Direct transfers may be
zero or positive. When bO = bO = 0; then
@bO()
@
= (1  )
"

1 + 
@ bfO
@
#
> 0;
When, bO = bO = 1    2

; then
dbO()
d
= (1  )
"
@b
@bO db
O
d
bfO + b@ bfO
@bO db
O
d
#
:
Since @
b
@bO dbOd > 0 and @ bfO@bO dbOd > 0; we have that dbO()d > 0:
Second, let bD denote the growth rate when the economy is dynastic, thus
bD = (1  ) bfD   1  bD(bD; );
where bfD  f(bD; ): Since bD = 0,
@bD()
@
= (1  )@
bfD
@
> 0:
Third, it follows immediately than when the economy is in a situation where
policies decide whether bequests are absent or present, i.e.,

h
+

1    2



i
(1 + )(1  ) >  <

(1 + )(1  ) ;
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policies will be such that the economy is in the regime which grows the fastest. Thus,
there is no resource curse under growth maximizing policies, since both regimes grow
faster at higher levels of . 
7.5 Proof of Proposition 6
We consider the problem
max
;
V Ot subject to   0;    ; and  < 1:
First, we choose  = 0; then V Ot = ln(c
O
2t) = ln

f( ; )[1  + (   )]kOt
	
:
Utility, V Ot ; is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions are all linear.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient. The Lagrangian
is
L = lnf( ; )[1  + (   )]kOt 	+ 1   2(   )  3(   1):
The ve Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
 
1  + (   ) + 1   2 = 0 (71)

1  + (   )  

1  
1
1   + 2   3 = 0 (72)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (73)
2  0;    ; 2(   ) = 0 (74)
3  0;  < 1; 3(   1) = 0 (75)
If  = 0 and  = 0; then 3 = 0: Combination of (71) and (72) then yields
1 =

1  :
In this case,
2 =
 
1   + 1:
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Since 2  0; when   ; this is then a solution.
If  = 0 and  > 0; then 2 = 3 = 0: Hence, from (71),
1 =

1  +  ;
which is satised for  > 0: From (72),

1  +  =

1  
1
1   ;
which is satised for  = (1  )(1  

): As  > 0, for this to be a solution  < :
If  > 0 and  > 0; then 1 = 3 = 0: Since,
2 =
 
1  + (   ) ;
for this to be a solution, 2 > 0: This requires  > ; which contradicts    :
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(;  ; 1; 2; 3) = (0; 0;

1  ;
 
1  ; 0) if   ; and (0; (1  )(1   ); 1 + ; 0; 0) if
 < : When  = 0 and  = (1  )(1  

); @
O
@
= f()
1++ (

1  +

+
  
1++ ):
Hence, when 
1  +

+
< 
1++  ;
@O
@
< 0.
Now, by continuity, this also holds for su¢ ciently smallpositive s. 
7.6 Proof of Lemma 4
We consider the problem
max

V t(c1t; c2t; ) subject to   0 and  < 1
given  =  ; and where V t(c1t; c2t; ) is given by (36) in the main text with insertion
of (26), (27) and (25) when the economy is constrained to be without bequests, and
with insertion of (31), (32), and (29), when the economy is constrained to be with
bequests. V t is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions are all linear.
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient. The Lagrangian
is
L = V t + 1   2(   1):
The three Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@V t
@
+ 1   2 = 0 (76)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (77)
2  0;  < 1; 2(   1) = 0 (78)
where
@V t
@
=
1
1  

1
c1t
@c1t
@
+

c2t
@c2t
@
+

 + 
1  

1
1 + ( ; )
@( ; )
@

: (79)
Under assumption 1,  =  ; on a balanced growth path without bequests,
1
cO1t
@cO1t
@
=

+ 
  
(1  )(1  ) ; (80)
and
1
cO2t
@cO2t
@
=   
(1  )(1  ) ; (81)
and
1
1 + O( ; )
@O( ; )
@
=

+ 
  
(1  )(1  ) : (82)
Substituting (80), (81), and (82) into (79), we get
@V
O
t
@
=
1
1  

1 + 
1  


+ 
 

+
1 + 
1  


(1  )(1  )

:
By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, if  = 0; then 2 = 0; thus by (76),
1 =  @V
O
t
@
:
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Since 1  0,

+ 1+
1 


1  

1+
1 



for this to be satised. Hence,   O
where O  1+
(1 )+1+
1 

(> 0) for  = 0 to be a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0; thus by (76),
1 =  @V
O
t
@
= 0:
Hence,

+ 1+
1 


(1 )(1 ) =

1+
1 


+
; which implies  = 
O 
(1+O)
; which is then
a solution when O > :
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(O; 1; 2) = (0; @V
O
t
@
; 0) if   O and ( O 
(1+OLG)
; 0; 0) if O > :
On a balanced growth path with positive bequests,
1
cD1t
@cD1t
@
=

1 +    (1  )  

(1  )(1  ) ; (83)
and
1
cD2t
@cD2t
@
=

1 +    (1  )  

(1  )(1  ) ; (84)
and
1
1 + D( ; )
@D( ; )
@
=   
(1  )(1  ) : (85)
Substituting (83), (84), and (85) into (79), we nd
@V
D
t
@
=
1
1  


1 +    (1  )

(1 + ) 

+
1 + 
1  


(1  )(1  )

:
By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, if  = 0 then 2 = 0: By (76), then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
:
Since 1  0,

+ 1+
1 


(1 ) 
h

1 (1 )
i
(1 + ) for this to be a solution. Hence,
1  (1  )  D where D  (1+)(1 )
(1 )+1+
1 

= (1  )O(> 0) is a solution.
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If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0: By (76), then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
= 0:
Hence,
h

1+ (1 )
i
(1+) =

+ 1+
1 


(1 )(1 ) which implies  =
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
:
Since  > 0; for this to be a solution, D > [1  (1  )]:
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(D; 1; 2) = (0; @V
D
t
@
; 0) if 1  (1  )  D and ( D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; 0; 0) if
D > [1  (1  )]: 
7.7 Proof of Lemma 5
We consider the problem
max

V t(c1t; c2t; ) subject to   0 and  < 1
given  =  ; and whereV t(c1t; c2t; ) is given by (38) in the main text with insertion
of (26), (27) and (25) when the economy is constrained to be without bequests,
and with insertion of (31), (32), and (29), when the economy is constrained to be
with bequests. V t; is twice di¤erentiable and concave and the restrictions are all
linear. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are thus both necessary and su¢ cient. The
Lagrangian is
L = V t + 1   2(   1):
The three Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@V t
@
+ 1   2 = 0 (86)
1  0;   0; 1 = 0 (87)
2  0;  < 1; 2(   1) = 0 (88)
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where
@V t
@
=

1 +

1  

1
c2t
@c2t
@
+

1  
"
1
c1t
@c1t
@
+

 + 
1  
 @(;)
@
1 + ( ; )
#
: (89)
Substituting (80), (81), and (82) from the proof of Lemma 4 into (89), we nd
@V Ot
@
=

1  

1 + 

+
 + 
1  
  
(1  )(1  ) +
1 + 
1  

+ 

:
By the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have that if  = 0; then 2 = 0: By (86), then
1 =  @V
O
t
@
:
Since 1  0,

1 +
(+ 1+1  )
1 


1   1 

1+
1 



for this to be satised. Hence,
  O; where O  1+
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

(> 0); for this to be a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0: By (86) rst condition then
1 =  @V
O
t
@
= 0:
Thus,

1 +
(+ 1+1  )
1 


(1 )(1 ) =

1 

1+
1 


+
; which implies  =
O 
(1+O)
: Since
 > 0; for this to be a solution, O > :
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(O; 1; 2) = (0; @V
O
t
@
; 0) if   O and ( O 
(1+O)
; 0; 0) if O > :
When bequests are positive, by use of (83), (84), and (85) from the proof of
Lemma 4, (89) is
@V Dt
@
=
1
1  

(1 + )

1 +    (1  )  

1 + + 

 + 
1  


(1  )(1  )

:
By the Kuhn Tucker conditions, if  = 0; then 2 = 0; and then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
:
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Since 1  0,
h
(+ 1 + 

+
1 
i

1   (1 + ) 1 (1 ) for this to be satised.
Hence, 1 (1 )  D where D  1+
+1+(+1  )
1 

=
1 

(1+)
(1 )2

+(1 )+1+
1 

(> 0)
for this to be a solution.
If  > 0; then 1 = 2 = 0: By (86), then
1 =  @V
D
t
@
= 0:
Thus,
h
(+ 1 + 

+
1 
i

(1 )(1 ) =
(1+)
1+ (1 ) ; which implies  =
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
:
Since  > 0; for this to be a solution, D > [1  (1  )]:
We conclude that there are two solutions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(D; 1; 2) = (0; @V
D
t
@
; 0) if 1  (1  )  D and ( D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; 0; 0) if
D > [1  (1  )]: 
7.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Bequests may be absent or present. Let O denote the growth rate under a young
spending policy when the economy is without bequests, then
O = 

(1  )fO   1  O(O; );
where 
  (O; ) = (+O)
(1+)(1 ) and f
O  f(O; ); and let O denote the growth
rate under an old spending policy when the economy is without bequests, then
O = (1  )fO   1  O(O; );
where   (O; ) = (+O)
(1+)(1 ) and f
O  f(O; ): Under both policies, direct
transfers from the government may be zero or positive. We treat young and old
policy in turn. Young policy (as given in lemma 4): When O = 0; then
@O()
@
= (1  )
"

1 + 
@f
O
@
#
> 0;
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when, O = 
O 
(1+O)
; then
dO()
d
= (1  )
"
@

@O
dO
d
f
O
+ 
@f
O
@O
dO
d
#
:
Since @

@O
dO
d
> 0 and @f
O
@O
dO
d
> 0; we have that d
O()
d
> 0: Old policy (as given in
lemma 5): When O = 0; then
@O()
@
= (1  )
"

1 + 
@fO
@
#
> 0;
when, O =
O 
(1+O)
; then
dO()
d
= (1  )
"
@
@O
dO
d
f
O
+ 
@f
O
@O
dO
d
#
:
Since
@
@O
dO
d
> 0 and
@fO
@O
dO
d
> 0; we have that
dO()
d
> 0:
Let D denote the growth rate under a young spending policy when the economy
is dynastic, thus
D = (1  )fD   1  D(D; );
where f
D  f(D; ): Likewise, let D denote the growth rate under an old spending
policy when the economy is dynastic, then
D = (1  )fD   1  D(D; );
where fD  f(D; ): Again, under both policies, direct transfers from the govern-
ment may be zero or positive. We treat young and old policy in turn. Young policy
(as given in lemma 4): When D = 0, then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@
> 0;
and when D = 
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@D
dD
d
> 0:
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Old policy (as given in lemma 5): When D = 0 then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@
> 0;
and when D =
D [1 (1 )]
(1+D)
; then
@D()
@
= (1  )@f
D
@D
dD
d
> 0:
Thus, there is no resource curse under young or old policies when the growth regime
remains unaltered. 
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